This paper deals with the legal identity of cooperatives. It is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the role and function of law and of comparative legal research on the topic of cooperative identity (sec. 2). The second part focuses on cooperative identity within the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) Principles and the ICA Statement on the Cooperative Identity at large (sec. 3). The third part compares the ICA Statement on cooperative identity with the legal identity that several European jurisdictions assign to cooperatives (sec. 4). Conclusions follow.
Introduction
This paper deals with the legal identity of cooperatives. It is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the role and function of law and of comparative legal research on the topic of cooperative identity (sec. 2). The second part focuses on cooperative identity within the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) Principles and the ICA Statement on the Cooperative Identity at large (sec. 3). The third part compares the ICA Statement on cooperative identity with the legal identity that several European jurisdictions assign to cooperatives (sec. 4). Conclusions follow.
Cooperative identity and the law
Beginning with the importance of law for cooperative identity, this section of the paper seeks to illustrate the aspects implied in, and the problems related to, a comparative legal analysis of this particular subject.
There is no doubt that, in general, law plays a substantial role in the development of cooperatives, their defence against potential detractors, and their good standing in competition with other legal forms that may be employed to conduct business, particularly companies 1 . This is true for a number of reasons, which are not now Notwithstanding the above, the legal dimension of cooperatives has not been sufficiently explored by scholars, especially at the international level and from a comparative perspective 4 . In light of its importance, the hope is that the cooperative movement will take responsibility for promoting and supporting research in this field.
This research should start from the specific topic of the legal identity of cooperatives, which naturally takes precedence over all other topics -not only for the sake of a systematic legal analysis, but also from a political point of view, as the aforementioned EUCJ decision suggests 5 . Surprisingly, however, the topic of the legal identity of cooperatives has not yet received the attention it deserves, even despite frequent warnings by eminent analysts about the "hybridization", "companization" or "degeneration" of the cooperative model 6 , which is a trend that may alter the natural and undoubted capacity of cooperatives to contribute to a better world 7 , or at least to sustainable economic development 8 .
Certainly, the identity issue is at the core of the ICA's mission 9 . Moreover, one should not forget that those provisions, commonly referred to as "ICA Principles", are in fact, embodied in the "Statement on the co-operative identity" 10 .
It seems, however, that the global debate on cooperative identity still has not taken the legal aspects of said identity into sufficient consideration.
Indeed, law could serve as a powerful lever for the defence and promotion of cooperative identity, as it may give cooperatives a precise, unquestionable and easyto-convey identity. This is particularly useful in the global context and before potential institutional opponents and/or promoters, such as states, courts, etc. 11 . Furthermore, it is more arduous to defend an identity that does not correspond to an identity defined by law. It is worth recalling again the use of the SCE Regulation by the EU
As correctly pointed out by HENRŸ, International Guidelines for Cooperative Policy and Legislation: UN Guidelines and ILO Recommendation 193
, assigning a distinct legal identity to cooperatives is a precondition to calling for their equal treatment relative to (for-profit) companies, for example in the field of taxation. Indeed, the distinct identity may justify a specific and diverse treatment of cooperatives as compared to companies, while treating cooperatives the same as companies would cause disparity given the uniqueness of cooperatives. The principle of equality requires that similar situations be treated in a similar way, while different situations must be treated in different ways. Fortunately, the EUCJ judgement of 8 September 2011 seems to share this line of reasoning. 6 See, respectively, SPEAR R., Co-operative Hybrids, paper presented at the Conference of Research Committee of the ICA with the CRESS Rhone-Alpes and the University Lyon 2 "Co-operatives' contributions to a plural economy" , where the codification of cooperative law is seen as a necessary means to maintain the distinctiveness of cooperatives, thus preventing isomorphism). 7 "Cooperative enterprises build a better world" is, as known, the slogan of 193/2012 UN International Year of Cooperatives, whose purpose is to highlight the contribution of cooperatives to socio-economic development, recognizing, in particular, their impact on poverty reduction, employment generation and social integration (see http://www.2012.coop/). 8 See, in particular, HENRŸ, International Guidelines for Cooperative Policy and Legislation: UN Guidelines and ILO Recommendation 193, which argues: "The alignment of cooperative law on stock company law not only infringes upon the cooperative identity which has to be preserved under public international law, it also weakens the potential of cooperatives to contribute to sustainable development". 9 On the ICA's website one may read: "ICA's priorities and activities centre on promoting and defending the cooperative identity, ensuring that co-operative enterprise is a recognised form of enterprise that is able to compete in the marketplace" (see http://www.ica.coop/ica/index.html). Moreover, the ICA's statutes include in the "Mission statement" the following: "[The ICA] is the custodian of co-operative values and principles and makes the case for their distinctive values-based economic business model which also provides individuals and communities with an instrument of self-help and influence over their development" (see http://www.ica.coop/ica/2009-ica-statutes.pdf). 10 For the reader's convenience (also given that it will represent one of the main points of the paper), the Statement is included (as found at http://www.ica.coop/ica/2009-ica-statutes.pdf) as an annex to this paper. 11 While a different problem may here arise, namely, that the legal identity does not correspond or ceases to correspond to the identity delineated by the cooperative movement.
Court of Justice to recognize the cooperative's distinct identity relative to other business organisations.
In light of this, one cannot but highly appreciate the attempts by a well known cooperative legal scholar to demonstrate the legal nature of ICA Principles. Said legal nature would derive from the fact that these principles are incorporated in ILO Recommendation 193/2002, which -as this scholar maintains through several arguments -should be considered a source of public international law 12 .
However, even if this theory is accepted, notwithstanding the importance of this result for the cooperative movement, the problem of the cooperative legal identity would remain unsolved and, thus, the need for comprehensive legal studies would remain unchanged. This is due to the fact that ICA Principles are too general and do not provide indications as to several crucial aspects of the cooperative identity 13 . Moreover, they are not followed by many current cooperative laws in Europe, which recognize as cooperatives organisations that do not correspond, even roughly, to the cooperative model provided by ICA Principles. More generally, there are several national cooperative rules whose compliance with ICA Principles is highly debatable.
The immediately preceding arguments represent the core of this paper and define its objective. The paper will underline those elements of the cooperative identity that clearly emerge from ICA Principles, as well as those elements that are not considered therein or that remain somewhat obscure.
This type of analysis is necessary to verify whether or not national cooperative laws respect ICA Principles, to ascertain the degree to which they depart from them, to understand how national legislators implement ICA Principles and substitute for the regulatory gaps in ICA Principles. This paper mainly aims to suggest a line and a method for future research, by briefly showing how the legal comparison might work and what elements such comparison might comprise. Certainly, this paper does not purport to offer a complete picture of the proposed subject, which would be an extremely complex and time-consuming task for a number of reasons.
Firstly, because in the real world the cooperative is a diverse and multi-faceted phenomenon. Its variety is due either to the nature of the relationship between the cooperative and its members (consumer-, worker-, producer cooperatives), or to the type of business involved (agricultural cooperatives, cooperative banks, etc.), and sometimes also to the specific aim pursued (e.g., social cooperatives). It also depends on the nature and characteristics of the membership (primary, secondary, tertiary cooperatives; small and large cooperatives; homogeneous and not homogeneous cooperative membership in terms of quantity/quality/nature of the individual contribution to the cooperative activity). The variety is greater than that which one may observe in the company form, which for this reason is an easier model to understand, study and regulate 14 .
However -although cooperative laws would adequately regulate their subject matter only to the extent that they take all its various aspects into account, consequently requiring future cooperative legal studies to deal increasingly with "cooperatives" instead of "cooperative" -there are general basic aspects which, as stated, still need to be addressed and fully developed by cooperative legal scholars. This scholarly research is a precondition for the further development of cooperative studies, and it is the research to which this paper is aimed.
Secondly, if one examines the national legislation on cooperatives, even within the same legal family or tradition (e.g., civil law), s/he would find not only one, but many diverse cooperative legal identities, as this paper will attempt to show.
The analysis is, moreover, complicated by the fact that the access itself to the national sources of cooperative law is not simple for a foreign observer or a comparative lawyer. In Europe alone there are at least six formally different models of cooperative legislation (ranging from a cooperative code, as in Portugal, to the absence of a cooperative law, as in Ireland) 15 , and this scheme would appear yet more complex if one also considers the duality general laws/special laws on particular types of cooperatives (France is an example evident in this respect), the residual (i.e., gap-filling) application of company law rules to cooperatives, the alternative default/mandatory rules in the regulation of cooperatives and the degree of regulatory power awarded to cooperative statutes, etc.
16 .
14 From a regulatory point of view, the structure of the property is the main element to take into consideration while differentiating the legal treatment of companies (namely, listed companies and non-listed companies, where "listed" should be used in a broader sense in order to include also those companies with a large and dispersed crowd of shareholders: see recently on the importance of this distinction for company regulation the Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, Brussels, 5 April 2011, in http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf), as there is a sole type of relationship between the company and its members (investment of capital, even if for different member motivations) and the nature of members and the output are irrelevant in this respect. 15 In this regard, it is possible to present and classify at least six models of cooperative legislation as follows: 1) Absence of cooperative law (Ireland) 2) Cooperative regulation in a formally independent act (e.g., Austria, Germany) 3) Cooperative regulation in the commercial code (e.g., Czech Republic, Slovakia) 4) Cooperative regulation in a company act (e.g., Luxembourg) or in the company code (e.g., Belgium) or in the natural persons and company act (e.g., Liechtenstein) 5) Cooperative regulation in the civil code (e.g., Italy, the Netherlands) 6) Cooperative regulation in a cooperative code (Portugal). Of course, this is only a formal distinction, which looks at the location of cooperative regulation. It may certainly happen that rules governing cooperatives are substantially identical notwithstanding their location. Points 2) and 6), in fact, differ only in the more emphatic use of the term "code" to name the act on cooperatives. For further details and comments see FICI, European Cooperative Law. 16 On all these aspects see the Study on the Implementation of the Regulation 1435/2003 on the Statute for European Cooperative Society (SCE), Executive summary and part I, October 2010. This Study is the result of a year-long project run by a Consortium made up of Cooperatives Europe, EKAI foundation and EURICSE (the latter as the Consortium leader), with the scientific direction of the author of this paper, in execution of a service contract with the EC. The Study was delivered in October 2010 and contains both a study on the implementation of the SCE Regulation and a study on the national cooperative laws of the 30 European countries involved, as well as a synthesis and comparative study, which highlights on the one hand the weaknesses of the SCE Regulation and the need for its amendment, and on the other hand the great variety of cooperative law in Europe.
The Study may be found at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/files/sce_final_study_part_i.pdf, This current state of the legislation (which may also be found if one compares national and supranational legislation, i.e., the SCE Regulation and national cooperative laws of the countries to which this Regulation applies) 17 further complicates both legal studies on cooperative identity and the promotion of cooperative identity by global and regional cooperative representative organisations. Comparing for research purposes and conveying a precise, unique identity for political reasons become more complex when national legislation is so varied.
Nevertheless, it seems that any theoretical suggestion regarding unification or even approximation of cooperative laws is received coldly by the relevant cooperative stakeholders, even when one underlines that this process should be bottom-up (that is, driven by the cooperative movement itself and not imposed from the top). Perhaps this is only the result of the current governance structure of the global cooperative movement, which appears to be nation-centred. By way of contrast, it would be more difficult to justify and support diversity in terms, and on the basis, of the opportunity to protect cultural and historical diversity among countries, if one holds that national law diversity may be a concrete obstacle to the development of cooperatives 18 . The issue of a uniform cooperative legal identity should be further pondered by, and within, the cooperative movement 19 .
Last but not least, a comparative legal study on cooperative identity requires consensus both on the elements to take into account to define such identity andmoving from a pure descriptive to a normative analysis -on the "ideal" identity, that is to say, the identity to assume as tertium comparationis. This paper will take ICA Principles, duly interpreted, as the starting point for its analysis, although it recognises that this is a conventional way to proceed and many other ways would be possible and legitimate as well 20 .
For these reasons, this paper aims to point out a issue and to present a possible method of analysis through which to view and to resolve this issue. Research on the field of cooperative legal identity from an international and comparative perspective would require additional resources of time, space and knowledge, and a team of scholars from different countries and legal traditions 21 .
Cooperative identity in ICA Principles
The relevance of ICA Principles (and in general of the ICA Statement on cooperative identity) for the legal analysis of cooperative identity is based on their nature of "persuasive" source of cooperative law. The strongest and most concrete evidence of this effectiveness is shown by their mention, or even their formal incorporation, in some national cooperative laws 22 .
Moreover, there is no doubt that the relevance of ICA Principles would considerably increase for one who shares the aforementioned theory, according to which ICA Principles are principles of public international law (having been incorporated in ILO Recommendation 193/2002).
ICA Principles convey a type of business organisation characterised both by the aims pursued and by the governance structure. Consequently, this paper will re-arrange their various statements according to the two items "aims" and "governance structure", which are the two elements sufficient and necessary in the legal analysis to identify a specific type of organisation and distinguish it from others 23 .
This paper will adopt a broad concept of "aims", which includes not only the final purpose of the cooperative, but also the activity performed in order to pursue it (in legal terms sometimes referred to as the "social object") 24 . In defining the aims, this paper considers the provisions on the destination of surplus to be equally relevant.
By way of contrast, the analysis does not include those statements that do not affect cooperative legal identity, such as the voluntary nature of the act of cooperative establishment (see "definition" and 1 st principle), and the nature of its members, whether individuals or cooperatives or other types of organisations (although this last element may be important for cooperative regulation in general) 25 .
Most statements of ICA Principles need to be interpreted and/or to be completed by way of interpretation. In some cases it is only a matter of literal interpretation, while in other cases functional and/or global interpretations are necessary. Nevertheless, many regulatory gaps remain, which may be interpreted either as permitting what is not expressly prohibited or as prohibiting what is not expressly permitted.
Cooperative aims
3.1.1. A cooperative is an organisation that runs an enterprise
In the "definition" embodied in the Statement, "a jointly-owned and democratically controlled enterprise" represents the way the cooperative (and its members) pursues its aims.
Therefore, according to ICA Principles, the cooperative is a particular type of organisation whose activity consists of running an enterprise. Consequently, those organisations whose "social object" is different (e.g., to award grants, to provide free services, etc.) might not be considered cooperatives.
A cooperative enterprise provides services to its members
The provision of services by a cooperative enterprise to its members emerges literally from the 1 st and the 3 rd principles.
This is one of the most significant elements of cooperative identity (especially in order to distinguish cooperatives from companies), as well as one of the most controversial. It seems that, according to ICA Principles, the cooperative enterprise is directed toward members, aiming to provide services to them. In other words, the members of a cooperative -who are or become such by providing and subscribing to its capital (see 3 rd ICA principle) -are also users of the services provided by their cooperative, which they obtain through transactions with the cooperative.
Therefore, in cooperatives, the members/owners are also the users/customers: they possess this "double quality"
26 . ICA Principles do not clarify whether the identification user-member has to be complete or may also be partial, which raises two fundamental questions: a. whether or not members other than users (i.e., non-user members) are admissible 27 ; and b. whether or not users other than members are possible (namely, whether or not the cooperative may provide services to non-members) 28 .
There is not an explicit solution to either question in ICA Principles.
26 Sometimes, this concept is also expressed by the formula "identity principle" to point out that in a cooperative owners and users are identical: 140, according to whom: "Some scientists of co-operative theory see this principle as the most important characteristic feature distinguishing co-operatives from other forms of organisation. It means that as a matter of principle the supporters (shareholders and decision-makers) and the users of the services of the cooperative enterprise (in case of service co-operatives: members' businesses or households; in case of workers' cooperative societies: the workers), are the same persons, i.e. are identical". This should also explain the qualification of cooperatives as "self-help organisations" (see ICA Statement under "values"), given that they are set-up by members to satisfy their common needs. However, this formula seems too generic as all organisations, including companies, are set-up to satisfy member needs (in case of companies, to invest their capital), although, of course, the nature of member needs in companies and in cooperatives is different, which, among other things (members' joint control, democracy, "external" allocation of part of surplus, etc.), contributes to determining the "social function" of cooperatives as compared to companies (on this point see below in the text). 27 Non-user members would inevitably be members who only confer capital and do not transact with the cooperative, as such, not distinguishable from the shareholders of a company, even though the ultimate reasons for providing capital to the cooperative may be varied (on this point see below in the text). 28 In the case of an affirmative response, one should further inquire about the conditions and the limits of the permitted activity with non-members (on this point see below in the text).
Although ICA Principles refer to the provision of services by the cooperative to its members, this does not exclude the possibility of other types of transactions taking place between the cooperative and its members, such as the provision by the cooperative of goods, and the provision by members of work (in worker cooperatives) or of goods and services (in producer cooperatives) 29 . "Provision of services" should be, therefore, broadly and not literally interpreted.
3.1.3. A cooperative is an organisation acting in the interest of its members, aiming to satisfy their common economic, social and cultural needs
The above heading stems from the "definition" embodied in the ICA Statement on the cooperative identity.
Hence, in strictly legal terms, the cooperative might not be considered an "altruistic" organisation or, more precisely, a "social enterprise", since it does not act exclusively or primarily in the general interest or in the interest of the community, but in the interest of its members (i.e., it typically aims to benefit members and not others). In this regard, there is no difference between cooperatives and companies 30 .
This does not mean, however, ignoring the particular social function of cooperatives (as compared to companies) 31 , which is the result of the aim pursued -to satisfy needs other than the remuneration of capital; of their particular governance structure -where persons count more than capital and all count equally given the principle of democracy (see sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.3.); and of the various obligations of "external" surplus destination included in ICA Principles (see sec. 3.1.4.) 32 .
This is perhaps the reason why the cooperative form has been used by national legislators for the introduction of the social enterprise in their national legal systems. The first generation laws on social enterprises in Europe, beginning in Italy in 1991, were laws on social cooperatives: a special type of cooperative characterised by the aim to pursue the general interest 33 .
Indeed, a conceptual distinction between social cooperatives and cooperatives needs to be drawn. Social cooperatives do not have the same aim as other cooperatives (or those cooperatives to which ICA Principles refer), because, as for example Italian Law 381/91 on social cooperatives states, they "act in the general interest of the community" and not in the main interest of their members as provided for in the definition of a cooperative in the ICA Statement on the cooperative identity 34 .
On the other hand, cooperatives have a social function that contributes to distinguishing them from companies and, as said, to approximating them to social enterprises.
3.1.4. A cooperative may only partially remunerate members for the capital subscribed (partial profit distribution constraint) and is obligated to allocate its surplus for certain purposes, including external/altruistic ones, such as the benefit of the cooperative movement and of the community
The 3 rd ICA principle clearly states that a cooperative may not have a total for-profit aim, namely, the aim to remunerate the members for the capital subscribed (which, by way of contrast, is the typical aim of companies). Only a limited compensation of the capital subscribed is permitted in cooperatives. This is another one of the most important elements of the cooperative identity, which contributes significantly to its distinction from that of companies (which normally do not face any distribution constraints).
ICA Principles do not specify what compensation on the capital is permitted, that is to say, they do not define the limits of profit distribution.
In addition, ICA Principles mention certain purposes for which the cooperative surplus should be allocated by members (rectius, by the cooperative), namely: -developing the cooperative, possibly by setting-up reserves, at least part of which should be indivisible (3 rd principle); -benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the cooperative (3 rd principle); -supporting other activities approved by the membership (3 rd principle); -education and training of members, managers, etc., and information of the general public (5 th principle); -strengthening the cooperative movement (6 th principle); -implementing policies for the sustainable development of the community (7 th principle).
In this regard, ICA Principles are somewhat vague.
Certainly, they do not put sufficient emphasis on the distribution of surplus in proportion to member transactions with the cooperative, which should be the cooperative distinctive way of rewarding members, given their "double quality". Indeed, while company members (i.e., shareholders) are remunerated because of, and in proportion to, the capital subscribed, cooperative members should be remunerated because of, and in proportion to, their transactions with the cooperative.
At the very least, this specific type of cooperative member remuneration should have a name (e.g., "patronage refunds") in a source as important as ICA Principles 35 .
ICA Principles should be clearer in establishing that the cooperative is obligated to setup indivisible reserves as a guarantee of financial stability (especially taking into account capital variability as provided for by numerous cooperative laws, also as a result of member exit from the cooperative) and of inter-generational solidarity among cooperative members.
Also the regime of indivisible reserves would need to be better clarified, with particular regard to the question of whether their distribution is possible in case of member exit from the cooperative or of cooperative dissolution. In general, the legal status of a non-profit organisation should embrace the requirement that accumulated reserves be not distributed also in case of member exit or of dissolution of the organisation, because otherwise a sort of ex post profit distribution to members would take place. But in cooperatives the situation is more complex, since on the one hand cooperatives may partially remunerate paid-up capital and on the other hand they may remunerate members in proportion to the volume of the transactions with the cooperative.
Finally, while it should be clearly stated that the external/altruistic allocations of surplus according to the 5 th (with regard to the information of the general public), 6 th and 7 th principles are compulsory, the extent to which they are so is not defined in any way 36 .
Governance structure

A cooperative is a democratic organisation
The democratic character of the cooperative mentioned in the "definition" and "values" statements is developed in the 2 nd ICA principle, according to which "in primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights ("one member, one vote") and co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner". This gets to the core of the cooperative identity 37 and of the distinction between cooperatives and companies, considering that in the latter the default principle of organisation is "one share, one vote" 38 . In cooperatives, each member has a vote regardless of the amount of the subscribed capital, which means that members are all treated equally notwithstanding the different extent of their individual financial participation in the cooperative. This is the reason why in some legal environments cooperatives are considered associations of persons, and why cooperative members are not to be considered shareholders although, in fact, they contribute to the capital of their cooperative (see 3 rd ICA principle); and additionally, it is the reason for the 36 As already pointed out, external/altruistic allocations of the cooperative surplus are another element of the social function of cooperatives. 37 As well, to the core of the intrinsic social function of the cooperative is: the school of democracy, the school of entrepreneurship, the instrument of economic democracy or market democratization. 38 See, for example, with regard to public limited-liability companies, art. 2351, par. 1, Italian Civil Code.
primacy of individuals in cooperatives 39 , and why cooperative capital and shares do not have the same (organisational and economic) function as in companies.
ICA Principles do not contain any explicit exception to the "one member, one vote" method in primary cooperatives, so that one may ask whether or not, in light of the 2 nd ICA principle, national cooperative laws may provide for exceptions, and in the case of an affirmative response, to what extent and under what conditions. The 2 nd ICA principle is more general only with regard to secondary, tertiary or higherlevel cooperatives, for which it requires a democratic manner of organisation, but not necessarily the "one member, one vote" method. Strictly speaking, cooperatives at other levels should only be considered those consisting of primary cooperatives, which reduces the scope of potential legal exceptions to the "one member, one vote" rule. It is not perfectly clear what might constitute a democratic manner of organisation when "one member, one vote" does not apply 40 .
A cooperative is an organisation controlled by its members (external control is not permitted)
In a certain sense, the 4 th ICA principle completes the democratic principle of administration (see sec. 3.2.1.), thereby strengthening its effects. The 4 th ICA principle makes it clear both that a single member cannot control the cooperative (which is already the consequence of the "one member, one vote" method), and that all members as a whole should be free to govern the cooperative without external influences deriving, for example, from contractual agreements to obtain finance 41 .
In the case of cooperative laws permitting non-user investor members in a cooperative -which is frequent in European national legislation -the 4 th principle should also play a role in order to prevent the cooperative from being controlled by this category of members.
It would perhaps read too much into the text the interpretation according to which this principle rules out the possibility of admitting non-members in the administrative organ of the cooperative or, at least, requires that the majority of members of the administrative organ be cooperative members. In fact, if non-member administrators are elected and may be removed by cooperative members, cooperative members maintain (albeit indirectly) the control of the cooperative and the 4 th ICA principle would be respected in this regard 42 . 39 See recital 8 in the preamble of the SCE Regulation, cited in point 56 of EUCJ judgement of 8 September 2011. 40 A possible democratic method in this instance might be considered that each cooperative, comprising the secondary or the higher-level cooperative, has a number of votes proportioned to the number of its members. 41 This point would need further analysis with specific attention to the subject matter of cooperative groups formed of cooperatives controlled by a single cooperative. 
A cooperative is an "open" organisation
The open membership in cooperatives is set forth by the 1 st ICA principle, according to which "Co-operatives are […] open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination".
However, this statement may be interpreted in two different ways: a. either in the sense that a cooperative is obligated to admit as members those who, being able to use its services, ask for admission ("open door" principle); or b. in the more limited sense that if and when the cooperative decides to admit new members, the cooperative cannot select them on a discriminatory basis.
In the first case, there would be an obligation to admit new members. In the second case, there would only be an obligation not to discriminate against applicants.
If the first interpretation prevails, the problem arises both for establishing substantive requirements and for establishing limits on this obligation; that is to say, if and when the cooperative refusal is legitimate, how to effectuate control of cooperative decisions with respect to admission requests and to protect third parties who wish to become members of a cooperative.
In addition, in light of the "open door" principle, it would be very difficult to justify a cooperative that permanently operates with non-members but, nevertheless, refuses requests for admission (especially when these requests come from the very nonmembers with whom the cooperative operates). The difficulty would be the same where a cooperative actually applies to non-member users the same conditions that it applies to its user-members, given that the former would not, in any case, hold the governance rights that the latter possess as members of the cooperative.
The open character of the cooperative, therefore, does not only imply capital variability, which is solely the technical legal instrument that facilitates new member admission in a type of organisation which, by its very nature, is "open" 43 .
A final remark is necessary upon the conceptual difference between an "open" organisation, such as a cooperative according to a decidedly, strict interpretation of the 1 st ICA principle, and an organisation whose shares may freely circulate, as is the principle in companies 44 .
An "open" organisation is an organisation that wishes or that is obligated by law to share the utility it produces with third-party subjects by making them members. This is a manifestation of the "solidarity" of the organisation and of its "social function", which derives from the fact that those who are members at any particular moment in time are not the exclusive beneficiaries of the organisation. Existing members in an "open" organisation accept the potential reduction of their utility by the admittance of 43 See, for example, art. 1, par. 2, and art. 3, par. 5, SCE Regulation: the second provision sets forth that "Variations in the amount of the capital shall not require amendment of the statutes or disclosure", which is the legal essence of capital variability. 44 While in cooperatives the opposite principle, that share transfers must be authorized by administrators, exists: see, for example, art. 2530, par. 1, Italian Civil Code. However, in cooperative laws, this regulatory aspect should be examined in connection with that of member resignation, since a liberal member resignation regime (which, in effect, may be found in some cooperative laws) may compensate for the prescriptive share transfer regime.
new members with whom they will have to share the overall utility 45 . These considerations might not be extended to an organisation whose shares are freely transferable, since the circulation of the shares only determines a modification of the owner, but not of the total number of owners (and therefore of the beneficiaries of the organisation). Hence, companies are organisations whose shares are normally transferable, but not "open" in the aforementioned sense, as is also shown by the regime of the modification of capital by the issuance of new shares, which normally protects current shareholders by allowing them to buy the new shares, thus preserving the existing equilibrium within the company 46 .
ICA Principles on cooperative identity summarily (and in comparison with the legal identity of companies)
The table below summarizes the results of the preceding analysis of the cooperative identity in ICA Principles and compares it with the ordinary legal identity of companies: differences emerge clearly. 
Cooperative identity and cooperative laws
This section of the paper will address those that appear to be the main questions in terms of cooperative identity raised by the cooperative laws of several European jurisdictions, particularly if one decides to adopt the ICA cooperative identity as the ideal-type for comparative reasons. This part of the paper will also show the great variety in defining a cooperative that may be found in European national legislation, together with the great variety in the implementation of each ICA principle.
45 Of course, third parties will assume after admittance also risks and losses, but the fact that they voluntarily apply for admission makes clear what the text intends to emphasize. 46 For example, in order to protect existing members, art. 2441, par. 1, Italian Civil Code, awards them the preemption right to subscribe the new shares in proportion to the amount of the shares owned, which may be excluded only when the interest of the company so requires (see art. 2441, par. 5).
Absence of cooperative law (and of a cooperative legal identity)
First of all, one should ask whether the absence of a national cooperative regulation, and consequently of a cooperative legal identity, is compatible with ILO Recommendation 193/2002, particularly if this is taken as a source of public international law.
In fact, point 6 of said Recommendation states: "A balanced society necessitates the existence of strong public and private sectors, as well as a strong cooperative, mutual and the other social and non-governmental sector. It is in this context that Governments should provide a supportive policy and legal framework consistent with the nature and function of cooperatives and guided by the cooperative values and principles"; and point 10 (1) adds: "Member States should adopt specific legislation and regulations on cooperatives, which are guided by the cooperative values and principles set out in Paragraph 3, and revise such legislation and regulations when appropriate".
While improving cooperative law for cooperative promotion is an issue that may be addressed in all European countries, there is a country in Europe without any specific cooperative regulation, which is Ireland.
It is currently being debated in Ireland whether or not a specific cooperative law is necessary 47 . If one considers ILO Recommendation 193/2002 as a source of public international law, it seems evident that this debate must not only evaluate the practical importance for cooperatives to possess or to not possess a legal identity -by also making an adequate comparison, in terms of positive outcomes for the cooperative movement, between countries with a "low-prescription" approach, such as Denmark, and those countries with a "high-prescription" approach, such as Norway 48 -but also take into account the binding force of ILO Recommendation 193/2002 and ICA Principles included therein (even leaving aside the issue of uniformity in national cooperative legal identity as a factor of cooperative growth) 49 .
Weak cooperative identity laws (and the "double track" model of cooperative regulation)
Some cooperative laws regulate cooperatives in a way that a cooperative identity is almost inexistent or, at least, not compliant with ICA Principles identity. It is difficult, in these cases, to place a distinct identity on cooperatives relative to companies 50 .
In some cases this is the result of a cooperative regulation solely based on default rules, i.e., rules that are not mandatory and that are subject to opt-out, so that they apply only if cooperative statutes do not provide otherwise.
For example, in the Luxembourg regulation of cooperatives, no prescriptions may be found regarding the activity with members, the distribution of surplus in relation to member transactions with the cooperative and the establishment of indivisible reserves. Moreover, the "one member, one vote" rule only applies in the absence of regulation by cooperative statutes (art. 117, par. 1, 4°, Law 10/8/1915 on commercial companies) 51 . In this country the situation is even worse if one considers the figure of the "cooperative societies organised as sociétés anonymes [public companies]" (art. 137-1 ff., Law 10/8/1915, as modified by Law 10/6/1999), which has been correctly defined as a "caricature" of a cooperative 52 .
Dutch (Civil Code, II book) and Swedish (EFL SFS 1987:667) cooperative laws represent similar examples. They fail to provide a complete cooperative identity and even those aspects that they cover (including democracy) are, in fact, only regulated by default rules, thus empowering cooperative statutes to provide differently.
A slightly different situation occurs in those jurisdictions which adopt a sort of "double track" model of cooperative regulation, as they recognize two (sub)types or (sub)categories of cooperatives, one of which is characterized by a very weak cooperative identity, while in the other some features of cooperative identity appearwhich, however, does not mean per se that these features correspond to those characterizing the ICA cooperative identity -and they are necessary for cooperative eligibility for a specific tax treatment. According to art. 4 of Danish Law 651/2006, "a co-operative (a co-operative society) means an undertaking […] whose objects are to help promote the common interests of the members through their participation in the business activities as buyers, suppliers or in any other, similar way, and whose profit, other than normal interest on the paid-up capital, shall either be distributed among the members in proportion to their share of the turnover or remain undistributed in the undertaking". This definition evidently contains some basic elements of cooperative identity. It highlights the particular nature of the cooperative membership/ownership (members as users), the profit distribution constraint ("normal interest") and the obligation to distribute the surplus in proportion to member activity with the cooperative (i.e., patronage refunds). However, there are no provisions on non-distributable reserves, external allocations of surplus (in favour of the cooperative movement or the community), democracy, or the open character of the cooperative.
Danish Law 1001/2009 recognizes as "taxable cooperatives", thus eligible for a specific tax treatment, cooperatives that promote the interest of at least 10 members; have a turnover with non-members that does not exceed 25% of the total turnover; distribute surplus to members, except for a normal interest on capital (equal to the discount rate of the Danish National Bank), in proportion to their turnover with the cooperative or reinvest it 54 . In effect, in the Danish example, tax law does not lay down additional requirements, but only specifies, for tax purposes, the general ones.
After the reform of 2003, Italian cooperative law (Civil Code, book V, art. 2511 ff.) presents a peculiar distinction between "mainly mutual cooperatives" and "other" or "not mainly mutual cooperatives".
While in the regulation of the first category of cooperatives all aspects of the cooperative identity are taken into account (which does not mean, however, that this regulation is per se to be considered conforming to ICA Principles) 55 , the second category is characterised by the absence of restrictions on the activity with nonmembers, on the distribution to members of dividends on the paid-up capital, of reserves, and of residual assets in case of dissolution.
According to what this paper has called the "double track" model, only "mainly mutual cooperatives" are awarded a specific tax treatment, which means that also in Italy tax law is crucial for cooperative identity 56 . By way of contrast, in other European jurisdictions, cooperative laws provide a cooperative identity closer to that of ICA Principles. In this regard, in Europe there are both "traditional" cooperative laws, strictly abiding by ICA Principles (see, among others, Bulgarian, Cypriot, Polish cooperative laws), and more innovative cooperative laws which try to combine the respect of ICA Principles with the need to adapt the regulation to particular (mainly financial) needs of the cooperative [see, among others and each to a different extent, Finnish, French, Italian (with limited regard to "mainly mutual cooperatives"), Norwegian, Slovenian cooperative laws].
However, as the following analysis will point out, the way in which ICA Principles are concretely applied, and the extent to which they are respected, vary among countries, thus giving rise to a plurality of cooperative legal identities.
The cooperative enterprise: activity with members and activity with nonmembers
As previously noted, according to ICA Principles, a cooperative is an organisation that aims to act with its members as users (of the services and goods provided by the cooperative), providers (of the services and goods used by the cooperative for its economic activity) or workers (worker cooperatives). This makes the cooperative different from companies, since in companies users (or providers and workers) do not necessarily coincide with shareholders (nor, if this happens, would companies be directed to maximizing their interest as users but only as shareholders). Consequently, unlike companies, cooperatives are not means to remunerate and accumulate capital, but to satisfy other specific needs.
Whether the law addresses and protects this cooperative profile must be investigated; for example, by denying or, at least, limiting the possibility for the cooperative to operate with non-members (i.e., to provide to, acquire from, and employ nonmembers).
In treating this point, one should also consider that the cooperative may face a momentary need to enlarge the area of its purchasers, sellers and workers, so that the real problem is raised by a permanent activity conducted with non-members 57 .
The analysis of European national cooperative legislation results as follow.
In some cooperative laws, the definition of cooperative explicitly includes the relationship between the cooperative and its members, while the aspect of the activity with non-members is not considered, which might be interpreted as if the cooperative may not act with non-members.
More exactly, there are cooperative laws that prohibit the activity with non-members in principle.
The example of French law is very interesting in this regard. Art. 3 of Law 47/1775 states: "Cooperatives may not allow non-members to benefit from their services, unless the specific laws that govern them authorize them to do so. If cooperatives avail themselves of this option, they are required to admit as members those persons who they allow to benefit from their activity or whose work they use, and who meet the conditions laid down by their statutes". This rule clearly shows the existing link between the "double quality" principle and the "open door" principle in the regulation of cooperatives, which has been already pointed out in this paper 58 .
In other cooperative laws the definition of cooperative explicitly includes the relationship between the cooperative and its members, but at the same time the law permits without explicit or precise restrictions the activity with non-members on the condition that cooperative statutes so provide 59 . This is the model also adopted by the SCE Regulation 60 .
Under other cooperative laws, cooperative transactions with non-members are explicitly regulated by imposing different restrictive measures (sometimes only for tax law purposes, as highlighted above). This means, however, that below that limit, or in presence of the conditions defined by law, the activity with non-members is permitted in any case. More precisely: -some cooperative laws establish a specific limit to the activity with non-members in relation to the activity with members. This limit may change: for example, it is represented by a turnover of 25% of the total turnover in Danish law (for tax law purposes); by revenues or costs from the activity with non-members not higher than revenues or costs from the activity with members, in Italian law (again for tax law purposes only); by 50% of the total operations with members, as in Spanish state law with regard to agricultural cooperatives (art. 93, par. 4, Law 27/1999); -other cooperative laws use general formulas, however, alluding to the fact that the activity with members should be prevalent: for example, Dutch law authorises cooperative statutes to provide for the conclusion with non-members of agreements similar to those concluded with members (art. 53, par. 3, Dutch Civil Code), but this power may not be exercised to such an extent that the agreements with members are only of a subordinate importance (art. 53, par. 4, Dutch Civil Code) 61 . Along similar lines, Norwegian law defines a cooperative as "a 58 In the sense that, in a cooperative acting with non-members, the refusal to admit them as members would not be legitimate (of course, if non-member users ask for it); namely, that a cooperative may permanently act with non-members only if its membership is really and effectively open. 59 See, for example, chap. 1, sec. 2 of Finnish Act 1488/2001: "The purpose of a co-operative shall be to promote the economic and business interests of its members by way of the pursuit of economic activity where the members make use of the services provided by the co-operative or services that the co-operative arranges through a subsidiary or otherwise. However it may be stipulated in the rules of the co-operative that its main purpose is the common achievement of an ideological goal"; and chap. 2, sec. 6, par. 1 (2), stating that: "Stipulations on the following may be taken into the rules of a co-operative: […] (2) that the services of the cooperative are to be offered also to non-members". 60 According to art. 1, par. 3, SCE Regulation, "An SCE shall have as its principal object the satisfaction of its members' needs and/or the development of their economic and social activities, in particular through the conclusion of agreements with them to supply goods or services or to execute work of the kind that the SCE carries out or commissions"; but art. 1, par. 4, establishes: "An SCE may not extend the benefits of its activities to non-members or allow them to participate in its business, except where its statutes provide otherwise". 61 See also art. 2, par. 2, Slovenian Cooperative Act of 1992.
group whose main objective is to promote the economic interest of its members by the members taking part in the societies as purchasers, suppliers or in some similar way", thus permitting transactions with non-members if they do not prevail over those with members 62 ; -yet other cooperative laws allow the cooperative to ask for a ministerial authorisation (see art. 4 of Spanish State Law 27/1999 in the case of a cooperative that faces a diminution of activity with members which may undermine its economic viability).
Membership: user-members and non-user (investor) members
According to ICA Principles, a cooperative has the purpose of engaging in transactions with its members, who are thus user-members. Consequently, the cooperative does not aim (unlike companies) to remunerate the capital provided by members. More precisely, the capital-based remuneration of members is allowed only up to a limited extent.
Given this, the question arises whether a cooperative may admit members who are only interested in the return on capital, but not in exchanging with the cooperative or in working with it. Putting it differently, the question is whether a cooperative may obtain risk capital also by "non-user" and, therefore, investor members.
Obviously, this is a relevant point in terms of cooperative identity, since the remuneration of member capital is the purpose of companies and the motivation of their shareholders. On the other hand, cooperatives, like companies, may face a problem of finance shortage, to which the admissibility of investor members might be a solution. How should cooperative law regulate this issue? Should the silence of ICA Principles be interpreted as a prohibition of pure investor members in a cooperative? And in any case, would the distribution constraint also apply to investor members 63 ?
Facing these issues, European national cooperative laws act differently: -the majority of cooperative laws do not deal with the issue of investor members, which might be interpreted as denial of their admissibility 64 ; -other cooperative laws simply empower cooperative statutes to provide for the admissibility of investor members 65 ; -yet other cooperative laws -along the same lines as the SCE Regulation, which has had a clear influence on this matter -on the one hand permit the participation of investor members in cooperatives (normally on the condition that cooperative statutes so provide), but on the other hand contain mandatory rules that prevent the cooperative from being controlled by the category of investor members 66 .
Surplus allocation
As pointed out above, according to ICA Principles, the distinct identity of cooperatives is also based on particular criteria of surplus distribution among members that are consistent with their nature of organisations aiming at operating with their members as users of the services provided, thus satisfying needs different from the investment of capital. Moreover, by making reference to forms of surplus allocation other than the distribution to members -namely, to indivisible reserves, the strengthening of the cooperative movement, and the sustainable development of the community -ICA Principles shape a type of organisation whose "social function" emerges clearly. Hence, the question arises whether, how and to what extent cooperative law embodies this key element of cooperative identity. This element comprises several aspects, which may be specifically treated and combined by the law in different ways. Therefore, the analysis of this particular point will be limited here to showing where cooperative law prevalently conflicts with ICA Principles in the regulation of this cooperative profile.
A number of European national cooperative laws do not clearly recognize the concept of "patronage refunds" and therefore do not distinguish them from "dividends" (as returns on capital) 67 . This obviously results in the fact that cooperative laws cannot obligate a cooperative to distribute patronage refunds instead of dividends 68 or to limit the distribution of dividends, thus indirectly promoting the distribution of patronage refunds. Hence, in many European countries, the matter of surplus distribution, although crucial for the cooperative identity, is not covered by mandatory rules, but entirely entrusted to cooperative statutes 69 .
Confusion on this point and a consequent lack of adequate provisions also emerge in the SCE Regulation.
First, the SCE Regulation calls "dividends" what in reality are "patronage refunds": in fact, art. 66, SCE Regulation, clearly entails the concept of patronage refunds when it refers to a payment provided to members "in proportion to their business with the SCE, or to the services they have performed for it".
Second, the SCE Regulation fails to obligate the SCE to distribute patronage refunds instead of returns on capital: indeed, art. 66, SCE Regulation, states only that "statutes may provide" rather than shall provide 70 .
Finally, the SCE Regulation considers the provision of a return on paid-up capital and on quasi-equity a possible way to allocate the surplus without establishing any limit to this way of surplus allocation (art. 67, par. 2, SCE Regulation) 71 . As for indivisible reserves, the comparative analysis reveals the existence of diverse approaches to this point 72 , which are: -laws that do not obligate cooperatives to set-up reserve funds, simply leaving the matter to cooperative statutes 73 ; -laws that obligate cooperatives to set-up reserve funds and prohibit their distribution to members only during the existence of the cooperative (i.e., they permit it solely in the case of cooperative dissolution) 74 ; -laws that obligate cooperatives to set-up reserve funds and prohibit their distribution to members even in the case of cooperative dissolution 75 ; obviously, those cooperative laws, which, more broadly, explicitly adopt the principle of "disinterested distribution" of cooperative residual assets, must also be included in this last group 76 .
The analysis of European national cooperative law also reveals that the "external" allocation of part of the surplus in favour of the cooperative movement and the community -which is envisaged by ICA Principles, thus determining the partially altruistic nature of that ideal-type of cooperative -is generally not imposed by policies/sme/files/craft/social_economy/doc/coop-communication-en_en.pdf, it is stated: "The Commission encourages Member States to ensure that the assets of cooperatives upon dissolution or conversion should be distributed according to the cooperative principle of 'disinterested distribution'; that is to say either to other cooperatives, where members can participate, or to cooperative organisations pursuing similar or general interest objectives. Such assets are often built up over generations, and remain collectively owned and are 'locked-in' to the objectives of those cooperatives. However, it should be possible to provide for the assets of a cooperative to be distributed to its members upon dissolution, in well examined cases. Member States are encouraged to provide sufficient protection to cooperative assets by ensuring that in case of take-over bids and of the consequent conversion of a cooperative to the form of a public company limited by shares the wishes of members and the objectives of the cooperative are respected".
legislators. There are important exceptions with regard to the compulsory destination of part of the surplus in favour of the cooperative movement 77 .
The democratic principle
The "one member, one vote" ICA Principle -which is perhaps the most important and traditional element of the cooperative identity -is in general followed by almost all European national cooperative laws.
However, implementation of the "one member, one vote" varies significantly across countries, so that, again, cooperative laws may be divided into the following groups: -there are cooperative laws where "one member, one vote" is a mandatory rule and no exceptions are provided by law 78 ; -there are cooperative laws where "one member, one vote" is only a default rule, and is thus subject to opt-out by cooperative statutes.
More precisely, this second group of laws may be further divided into several subgroups given that: -some cooperative laws do not set explicit limits to cooperative statutes, which means that derogation is free in principle 79 ; -other cooperative laws permit only certain derogations based on the nature of the cooperative (e.g., agricultural cooperatives), of the membership (e.g., secondary cooperatives, cooperatives among entrepreneurs), of the criterion applied to award more votes (e.g., in proportion to member activity with the cooperative), of the beneficiary (e.g., investor member), or on a combination of these elements 80 ; -yet other cooperative laws set specific limits on cooperative statutes' power to derogate, in order to prevent the cooperative from being controlled by a single member (or by a single category of members) 81 .
The admission of new members and the "open" character of a cooperative
By referring to the open membership of cooperatives, the 1 st ICA principle makes another aspect of the sociality of cooperatives stand out: if membership is open, all people wishing to join the cooperative may, in theory, take advantage of the benefits the cooperative is able to provide. Evidently, the concept of open membership presupposes, by its very nature, that non-members are treated differently (and not better) than members, because otherwise this cooperative feature would make no sense. As previously pointed out, however, the ICA requirement of open membership can be interpreted in two different ways, either as an obligation for a cooperative to admit new members, or only as an obligation not to discriminate against third parties who ask for admission. In any case, as already observed, the open character of the cooperative would require a technical legal instrument that facilitates new admissions, namely, capital variability, which in fact is provided for by nearly all European national cooperative laws (in many cases in the very definition of the cooperative).
How have legislators interpreted and applied the 1 st ICA Principle?
The SCE Regulation seeks a sort of compromise between cooperative autonomy and the interest of third parties in a rule that may be found in several European countries 82 . Art. 14, par. 1, SCE Regulation, on the one hand states that the request for admission is subject to approval by administrators; and on the other hand, in the case of refusal, entitles candidates to appeal to the general meeting. Therefore, the open character of the cooperative is certainly not interpreted in a manner that obligates a cooperative to admit third parties nor so as to extend to third parties a right to be admitted. In fact, only indirect protection through the right to appeal to the general meeting (which, of course, may refuse the request) is offered to third parties' interest. The question arises whether third parties may in some way oppose an opportunistic, unjustified, refusal of admission 83 . In any case, it would be important that cooperative laws explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of those elements, such as gender and race, mentioned by the 1 st ICA principle, as some cooperative laws already do 84 .
Other cooperative laws provide weaker rules in this regard or fully empower cooperative statutes to regulate the matter, which is questionable from the point of view of cooperative identity and the respect of ICA Principles.
Conclusions
The comparative law analysis conducted in this paper has shown that, in Europe alone, several different cooperative legal identities may be found, and that, consequently, ICA Principles are not strictly followed or are broadly interpreted by European national legislators.
Certainly, this situation does not help differentiate cooperatives from the mainstream and dominant model of the investor-owned for-profit company, which may have a negative impact on market pluralism. Indeed, a specific legal treatment of cooperatives, for example under tax and competition laws, is harder to justify when their legal identity is unclear, widely varied across countries, and in certain cases far from the paradigmatic one proposed by ICA Principles. That, among other things, calls for the promotion of legal studies, particularly comparative ones, by the cooperative movement and its representative organisations.
In addition, and primarily, more should be done with regard to the effectiveness of ICA Principles. Their effectiveness does not only depend on their presumed quality of public international law principles, as a consequence of their formal incorporation in ILO Recommendation 193/2002, but also on their completeness and clarity, as well as on the capacity of the ICA to impose this standard, which perhaps presupposes a governance of the cooperative movement less nation-centred than it currently appears to be. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that this paper has used ICA Principles as point of reference for the comparative law analysis of cooperative identity, one cannot exclude that other terms of comparison might appear more adequate in the future, especially if the ICA does not make sufficient efforts to detail and renovate its Principles, thus improving their effectiveness.
Cooperative law scholars should also study more the matter of uniformity and diversity in cooperative law. This is an issue that has drawn the attention of company law scholars 85 , but has not yet been considered by cooperative law scholars. The common idea that there is a local tradition in cooperative law, which needs to be protected in any case, might be challenged in the interest of the cooperative movement itself and of market pluralism 86 . Perhaps, a global market imposes a global cooperative identity, and the lack of a cooperative uniform legal identity is a concrete obstacle to the development of cooperatives and the accomplishment of effective pluralism in the marketplace. 85 Quotations are pointless as there are many company law articles focusing on this issue. However, to start, see the papers published on the European Corporate Governance Institute website (www.ecgi.org). 86 Again, it is worth underlining that uniformity in cooperative law may be limited to the central elements of the cooperative identity without including those aspects (mainly pertaining to the governance) that do not relate to this specific profile of cooperative regulation. In other words, uniformity and diversity in cooperative law may co-exist.
Annex: ICA Statement on the Co-operative Identity
Definition A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointlyowned and democratically controlled enterprise.
Values
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others.
Principles
The co-operative principles are guidelines by which co-operatives put their values into practice. 2 nd Principle: Democratic Member Control Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner. 3 rd Principle: Member Economic Participation Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their cooperative. At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the cooperative. Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership. 4 th Principle: Autonomy and Independence Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members. If they enter into agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy. 5 th Principle: Education, Training and Information Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives. They inform the general public -particularly young people and opinion leaders -about the nature and benefits of co-operation. 6 th Principle: Co-operation among Co-operatives Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through local, national, regional and international structures. 7 th Principle: Concern for Community Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies approved by their members".
